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Abstract 
Influenza viruses are constantly changing, which requires on-going characterization to 
provide early identification of emerging strains with pandemic potential. A close second to 
surveillance in prioritization is the ability of a public health system to respond to a developing 
pandemic. This report provides a detailed report on specific capabilities and capacities in public 
health preparedness within Riley County. The capabilities, capacities, and assessments within 
this report are in the context of an influenza pandemic. A variety of sometimes overlapping 
emergency standards, response capacities, and evaluation tools are in use within the nation. 
When appropriately used, these standards and measures can provide key insight across the nation 
into the strengths and weaknesses of the local public health system. 
Riley County’s recent local public health system assessment acknowledged a strength in 
disease identification, epidemiology, and investigation. Additionally, local emergency response 
agencies have shown great capabilities and capacities in preparing for and responding to daily 
emergencies. Information sharing, emergency operations coordination, and public information 
and warning capabilities recently received a favorable evaluation. The broader Riley County 
public health system, however, may be much less prepared and capable than those commonly 
identified as core emergency response agencies (police, fire, emergency medical services, and 
emergency management). Interagency communication and coordination are especially in need of 
development. If the local public health system is unable to respond as necessary to a complex 
public health emergency, such as an influenza pandemic, the local infrastructure may fail. Well-
developed public health preparedness in advance of these public health emergencies are key to 
the success of the jurisdiction. 
This report summarizes observations of local public health agencies, some past agency 
responses, and some assessment of agency preparedness with a brief assessment on Riley 
County’s potential vulnerability to an influenza pandemic. This paper summarizes 
recommendations to: (1) develop a public health vulnerability analysis addendum to Riley 
County’s Hazard Analysis, (2) complete the systematic review developed herein, (3) evaluate the 
Riley County Health Department Public Health Emergency Preparedness program with available 
standards and measures, and (4) pursue medical surge planning with key stakeholders. 
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 RECENT HISTORY OF PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS CHAPTER 1 -
Oftentimes, the most significant and ever-present threat to the health of an individual, as 
well as the collective health of the public, comes from the smallest forms of life on this planet. 
The earth contains a complex ecosystem with microscopic pathogens that may at any time cause 
serious disease or illness: viruses, bacteria, protozoa, and fungi. These organisms are constantly 
developing capacities and mechanisms to better infect, grow, and evade detection within the 
human body. Of particular global focus are a set of RNA viruses known as influenza viruses. 
Influenza viruses, largely due to their mutation and reassortment rates, make them an ever-
evolving enemy. This feature allows for the increased likelihood of a worldwide outbreak, or 
pandemic, which has the potential to cause a massive impact on the public health system and 
economy. 
Experts agree that another influenza pandemic is inevitable; it will not be a question of if, 
but when. This report focuses on the mitigation potential of public health preparedness activities 
in advance of an influenza pandemic in Riley County, Kansas. 
1.1 PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
Influenza (flu) viruses are highly contagious pathogens of the respiratory tract that are 
easily spread from person-to-person throughout all populations. Once contracted, the host often 
develops mild to severe illness within a few days.  To further complicate the problem, there are 
three genera of influenza which are present in the world (Influenzavirus A, Influenzavirus B, and 
Influenzavirus C) which are further divided into serotypes according to combinations of viral 
surface proteins(World Health Organization Media Center, 2014). These surface proteins, 
hemagglutinin (HA, H) and neuraminidase (NA, N), are divided into subtypes by distinctions 
between each glycoprotein: 16 H subtypes (H1-H16) and 9 N subtypes (N1-N9). The type A 
virus is the most virulent, most mutable (largely due to zoonotic transmission) influenza species 
and has been the only influenza species known to cause pandemics(World Health Organization 
Media Center, 2014). Many virus subtypes may circulate in a given season that, once identified 
and assessed by prevalence, may have seasonal prophylaxis (vaccines) developed
1
 to combat 
dominant strains; vaccine efficacy often wanes when dominant subtypes become less dominant. 
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 Type C influenza cases are far less frequent and are not included within seasonal vaccines. 
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Influenza results in an estimated three to five million cases of severe illness and 250,000 to 
500,000 deaths. 
Pandemics occur when a previously nonexistent, or novel, virus strain suddenly mutates 
into a new strain due to antigenic shift. This often occurs after the pathogen’s transmission is 
between two different species. This novel virus will create widespread global outbreaks in a 
relatively short period, assisted by global travel and shipping networks. Additionally, pandemics 
have a wavelike tendency of prevalence that exists in 6 to 8 week periods. The widespread and 
wavelike nature of this public health emergency will make mobilization of resources difficult 
due to the many sites and instances of emergency. 
1.1.1 Diagnostic Definitions 
As confirmation of a specific disease or pathogen is not always possible (or cost-
effective), it has become necessary to make some diagnostic assumptions based on patient 
symptoms. One such generalization of patients is for those exhibiting symptoms within a broadly 
defined category of influenza-like illness (ILI); cases requiring hospitalization further classify as 
a severe acute respiratory infection (SARI). Clinical presentations of influenza infection do not 
easily distinguish from other respiratory conditions. Cases identified as ILI and SARI may not 
necessarily always indicate influenza but may serve to identify influenza trends in lieu of other 
data. Although the specific conditions required to meet the definition of ILI and SARI vary 
within global regions, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have defined a 
specific set of conditions for use within the United States (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013): 
Influenza-Like Illness (ILI) Case Definition 
No other known cause of illness, 
Fever (temperature of 100 °F [37.8 °C] or greater), 
Cough, and/or 
Sore Throat 
Severe Acute Respiratory Illness (SARI) Case Definition 
ILI Case Definition 
Hospitalization Due to Illness 
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Clinical laboratories confirm influenza cases via influenza tests conducted in routine 
diagnostics. The following diagnostic tests may confirm infections due to influenza (Influenza 
Division (CDC), 2013): 
 Viral culture isolation, 
 Direct fluorescent antibody assay (DFA), 
 Indirect fluorescent antibody assay (IFA), 
 Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), or 
 Rapid influenza diagnostic test (RIDT). 
1.2 INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE 
1.2.1 National Surveillance Strategies 
Collaborative efforts make the national influenza surveillance system possible between 
the Epidemiology and Prevention Branch in the Influenza Division of the CDC and its many 
state, local, territorial, and private entities supporting public health surveillance. As shown within 
the CDC Overview of Influenza Surveillance in the United States, there are five (5) categories of 
influenza surveillance in place (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013):  Virological Surveillance, 
Outpatient Illness Surveillance, Mortality Surveillance, Hospitalization Surveillance, and 
Summary of the Geographic Spread of Influenza. Together, these categories of influenza 
surveillance provide an accurate understanding of influenza activity within the nation and can 
serve to identify emerging pandemic strains. 
1.2.1.1 Virological Surveillance 
The CDC receives data reports on specimens taken for respiratory illness from 
approximately 85 World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Laboratories and 60 
National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System (NREVSS) laboratories across the 
United States (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013). Data for each specimen includes its 
confirmation disposition (positive or negative), influenza A subtype (H1 or H3; WHO 
laboratories, only), age/age group of the patient, and basic epidemiologic information from the 
patient. This WHO and NREVSS laboratory data is summarized within the CDC’s weekly 
influenza surveillance report, FluView. 
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Starting in 2007, identification of a novel strain of Influenza A within capable 
laboratories has become a nationally notifiable condition, including non-human subtypes as well 
as unsubtypable strains. Rapid reporting of atypical strains is key to effective public health 
response to a potential emerging pandemic. 
1.2.1.2 Outpatient Illness SurveillanceU.S. Outpatient Influenza-like Illness Surveillance 
Network (ILINet) receives data of influenza confirmations or presumptions following patient 
visits to healthcare providers (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013). ILINet consists of more than 
2,900 outpatient healthcare providers within all 50 U.S. states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands with more than two-thirds of those providers providing weekly reports. The percentage of 
ILI cases reported to public health across the state arises by taking the total state population as a 
weight. Averaging non-influenza weeks
2
 for the previous three seasons with the addition of two 
standard deviations results in the development of a national baseline. In the same manner, states 
grouped within the existing Homeland Security Regions afford data to develop regional 
baselines; Kansas is within Homeland Security Region VII. This ILI data has been adapted to the 
ILI Activity Indicator Map, which allows for a visual representation of ILI activity (over 10 
levels of severity) by influenza season week. 
Due to the increased national focus on influenza from the 2009-2010 influenza season, 
the CDC provided another means for obtaining surveillance information for ILI within the 
nation. Using the existing Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), the world’s 
largest on-going telephone health survey (more than 400,000 adults interviewed each year), the 
CDC added additional modules to the survey to obtain data on ILI rates and vaccination rates for 
adults and children (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). The availability of data 
provided by many states within the BRFSS modules contributed to successful surveillance. 
1.2.1.3 Mortality SurveillanceTwo systems are in use for surveillance on influenza-associated 
deaths (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013):  122 Cities Mortality Reporting System and Influenza-
Associated Pediatric Mortality Surveillance System. The 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System 
obtains data from vital statistics offices receiving death certificates with public health 
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 Non-Influenza Weeks:  periods of two or more consecutive weeks below 2% of the season’s total specimens 
obtained which test positive for influenza. 
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considerations and provides the Epidemiology and Prevention Branch with the number of deaths 
with a listed contributing cause of death from pneumonia or influenza. This percentage of deaths 
due to pneumonia and influenza (P&I) is compared to seasonal baselines to provide additional 
surveillance data for influenza. An “epidemic threshold” for P&I deaths is made statistically 
significant as identified to be at least 1.645 standard deviations above the seasonal baseline. 
Influenza-associated deaths in children (persons less than 18 years) became a nationally 
notifiable condition, received by the CDC, in 2004. This system may receive information on any 
child death with a laboratory confirmation of influenza. 
1.2.1.4 Hospitalization Surveillance 
Hospitalizations due to ILI (further defined as SARI cases) are among the more reliable 
indicators of influenza activity, as patients are more likely to have a laboratory confirmation of 
influenza following diagnostics. The Influenza Hospitalization Surveillance Network (FluSurv-
NET) receives case reports following review of hospital laboratory and admission databases for 
confirmed cases of influenza (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013). The network covers over 70 
counties participating voluntarily in the ten Emerging Infections Program states (CA, CO, CT, 
GA, MD, MN, NM, NY, OR, and TN) as well as three additional states (MI, OH, and UT). As 
Kansas and the remaining thirty-six states do not provide data to this system, FluSurv-NET 
makes national estimations by comparisons with adjacent participating states. 
1.2.1.5 Summary of the Geographic Spread of InfluenzaState and Territorial health agencies 
report estimations for geographic spread of influenza activity throughout their jurisdictions with 
weekly State and Territorial Epidemiologists Reports (Influenza Division (CDC), 2013). These 
reports identify jurisdictional influenza prevalence within five (5) levels of activity (Influenza 
Division (CDC), 2013): 
 No Activity:  no new laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza and no reported increase in 
ILI cases. 
 Sporadic:  small numbers of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases but no significant 
increase in ILI cases. 
 Local:  small outbreaks or regional increases in laboratory-confirmed influenza or 
general increases in ILI cases. 
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 Regional: significant regional activity of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases and ILI 
cases within at least two but less than half of the regions within the jurisdiction. 
 Widespread:  significant activity of laboratory-confirmed influenza cases and ILI cases 
within at least half of the regions within the jurisdiction. 
1.2.2 Kansas Surveillance Strategies 
The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) is poised at the junction 
between local surveillance efforts and national surveillance strategies, often sending data directly 
to the CDC while also receiving pertinent reports from the CDC for use in surveillance efforts. 
KDHE’s Bureau of Epidemiology and Public Health Informatics (BEPHI) assumes the function 
of liaison to the CDC as well as overseer of local public health disease investigation. Per Kansas 
Administrative Regulation (K.A.R.) 28-1-2, KDHE is to be notified within a critically defined 
timeframe when certain infectious diseases are diagnostically confirmed. KDHE receives a 
multitude of disease reports, which route to the BEPHI or the Bureau of Disease Control and 
Prevention, as appropriate. 
On March 5
th
, 2012, KDHE made available a new electronic disease surveillance system 
to the state of Kansas (Smith, 2013). This system, dubbed EpiTrax, replaced the prior KS-EDSS 
system as an “open-source, highly configurable, comprehensive surveillance and outbreak 
management application designed for public health.” The system connects local, state, and 
federal public health agencies into a network to support the identification, investigation, and 
mitigation of communicable diseases and environmental health hazards. Electronic laboratory 
reporting from physicians and local laboratories allows for significantly higher confidence in 
investigation necessity and supports local investigators in making appropriate decisions in 
management of patient care while preventing unnecessary morbidity and mortality that may 
result from slow or ineffective investigations. EpiTrax allows both state and local partners to 
enter pertinent patient health and demographic information, disease epidemiology, clinician 
findings, and laboratory results to develop case files that encompass the entire public health 
investigation. 
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1.3 STRESS TO THE SYSTEM 
Four influenza pandemics have occurred within the last one hundred and twenty-five 
years: 1889 Russian Influenza Pandemic (H2N2 suspected), 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic 
(H1N1), 1957 Asian Flu (H2N2), 1968 Hong Kong Flu (H3N2), and 2009 Swine Flu Pandemic 
(H1N1). Each pandemic has resulted in millions of deaths and has brought acute stresses on 
critical infrastructures and systems as well as the economy following workplace absences (public 
health and medical surges) and reduction in provision of goods and services. Potentially high 
proportions of illness in a short period of time (such as 25-30% of U.S. population) and death 
could cause a loss from 1 to 4.25% of national gross domestic product (GDP)(U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2012). 
The acute nature of these public health emergencies makes the burden to public health 
and critical infrastructures even more taxing. Following a 2012 U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS, HHS) review of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, several critical 
aspects of stress to the public health and medical systems were noted(Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2012): 
 monitoring stress of public health and medical systems were challenging at a national 
level, 
 the pandemic did not fully test the healthcare system’s ability to address a medical surge 
(via the national bed tracking systems and other means), and 
 more complete medical surge guidelines and standards for healthcare providers are 
needed, with considerations toward resource constraints. 
1.4 PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES 
The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic allowed for the exercise of contemporary public 
health emergency preparedness and response plans following the increased national focus on 
preparedness initiated by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, 
as well as subsequent attacks using biological agents and prevalence of avian influenza (H5N1) 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2009, p. 1). These events 
allowed for high-level policymaking in which comprehensive plans have been developed and 
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updated by the efforts of the White House, Homeland Security Council (HSC), DHHS, and the 
CDC, among many other federal, state, and local entities. 
1.4.1 National Public Health Preparedness Strategies 
1.4.1.1 Public Health Emergency Preparedness Capabilities (CDC) and Healthcare 
Preparedness Capabilities (ASPR) 
A further result of planning activities at the federal level, the CDC published a March 
2011 document: Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local 
Planning. In quick succession, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 
published in January 2012: Healthcare Preparedness Capabilities: National Guidance for 
Healthcare System Preparedness. Together, these documents explicitly define public health 
preparedness and relevant standards for public health and healthcare preparedness programs, 
respectively. These documents further allow for deliverable measures to support the Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) and the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) 
cooperative agreements, respectively. The PHEP and HPP capabilities, often containing similar 
and linked measures, provide an extensive list of standards and measures that are critically 
important to emergency preparedness and response. 
Originally set in place as competitive grant funding for bioterrorism preparedness, the 
current status of PHEP grant funding follows an allocation formula based on an all-hazards 
preparedness approach. This PHEP funding is awarded to all U.S. states, eight freely associated 
territories, and four directly funded localities: Chicago; Los Angeles County; New York City; 
and Washington, D.C. (Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 2011). A visual 
representation of awardees is within Figure 1, below, with Kansas being the darkened state in the 
middle, four markers in place for localities, and a listing of the freely associated territories. 
Cooperative agreements provide grant funding in which awardees are required to attempt to 
complete annual preparedness deliverables within their jurisdiction. Local PHEP grant funding 
(as grant subawardees) allows for employment (partial to full salary) of public health 
professionals at local health departments; when funding is insufficient, other agency personnel 
assume the PHEP functions. The state (grant awardee) sets forth work plan deliverables for these 
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PHEP Coordinators, or other agency personnel, to meet in order for the state to accomplish 
broader preparedness deliverables. 
 
Figure 1: Federal Public Health Preparedness Awardees 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014) 
Federal grant administrators developed the PHEP deliverables from the CDC’s Public 
Health Preparedness Capabilities, a set of fifteen specific categories of actions that directly 
support public health preparedness activities. These capabilities are further grouped into the 
following categories (Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 2011):  
Biosurveillance, Community Resilience, Countermeasures and Mitigation, Incident 
Management, Information Management, and Surge Management. 
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Biosurveillance 
Public Health Laboratory Testing 
Public Health Surveillance and Epidemiological 
Investigation 
 
Incident Management 
Emergency Operations Coordination 
 
Countermeasures and Mitigation 
Medical Countermeasure Dispensing 
Medical Material Management and Distribution 
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions 
Responder Safety and Health 
Community Resilience 
Community Preparedness 
Community Recovery 
 
Information Management 
Emergency Public Information and Warning 
Information Sharing 
 
Surge Management 
Fatality Management 
Mass Care 
Medical Surge 
Volunteer Management 
 
As federal funding allocations continue to decline, awardees and subawardees alike 
continue public health preparedness with fewer and fewer available resources. 
1.4.2 National Pandemic Influenza Strategies 
1.4.2.1 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and Implementation Plan (Bush 
Administration) 
Completed in 2005, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (National Strategy) 
was one of the first comprehensive programs within the United States with aims to address the 
threat of pandemic influenza (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2005). The document outlines 
the national strategy for preparation, surveillance, and response to a developing pandemic within 
the United States. The document also outlines the vulnerabilities and opportunities present within 
all levels of government, the private sector, and of individual citizens to inform the nation of 
ways in which to prepare for or respond to a pandemic.  As a follow-up to this document, the 
Bush Administration provided the detailed Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza which describes “more than 300 critical actions” to assist Federal 
departments and agencies in preparation for a pandemic influenza event(U.S. Homeland Security 
Council, 2006). To review progress made, the Homeland Security Council prepared an 
assessment of progress in the year following publication of the Implementation Plan, a One Year 
Summary. This document allowed federal preparedness efforts to course correct where 
necessary, and to prioritize perceived gaps in capabilities. These efforts set the standards for 
national pandemic preparedness planning. 
11 
1.4.2.2 Pandemic Influenza Plan (DHHS) 
Alongside the development of the National Strategy, the DHHS developed the HHS 
Pandemic Influenza Plan in 2005. This plan contains important planning considerations which  
are consistent with the recently produced World Health Organization (WHO) international 
guidance and considerations as well as the federal National Response Plan (NRP)(U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2005). The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan consists 
of three parts:  (1) Strategic Plan, (2) Public Health Guidance for State and Local Partners, and 
(3) HHS Agencies’ Operational Plans. The Strategic Plan contains governmental considerations 
and planning assumptions for preparation and response to pandemics and identifies key roles of 
federal agencies during a pandemic. The Public Health Guidance provides recommendations to 
state and local public health and medical agencies, as frontline responders, in order to improve 
surveillance, diagnosis, reporting, and response in the event of a pandemic. The remaining 
Operational Plans prioritized efforts within time and financial constraints. 
1.4.2.3 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (109th Congress), Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act (113
th
 Congress) 
Further Federal preparedness efforts led to the development of the Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA, Public Law No. 109-417), which was passed by Congress 
and signed by President Bush in December 2006 and amended the prior Public Health Service 
(PHS) Act (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2013). The 
PAHPA, like the PHS Act before it, afforded the DHHS authority to lead Federal public health 
and medical activities for preparedness and emergency response needs. The Act allowed for the 
development of medical countermeasure distribution systems and the Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority (BARDA) as well as to support the needs of Emergency 
Support Function (ESF)-8 – Public Health and Medical Response. 
In March 2013, Congress passed the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 
Reauthorization Act (PAHPRA, Public Law No. 113-5), which was signed by President Obama 
(Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2014). The PAHPRA built 
upon national health security efforts by the DHHS and led to the authorization of funding for 
public health and medical programs such as the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) 
Cooperative agreement and the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP). The PAHPRA amended 
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the existing Public Health Service Act to empower state health departments as well as the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration. 
1.4.2.4 Strategic National Stockpile 
Originally developed in 1999 as a pharmaceutical cache, the Strategic National Stockpile 
(SNS) was repurposed in 2003 to be a source of medicines and supplies to supplement and 
resupply state and local inventories following exhaustion of their supplies(Association of State 
and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), 2012). The development of BARDA within the 
DHHS in 2006 followed the development of national preparedness plans for pandemic influenza. 
BARDA facilitated the stockpiling of influenza vaccines of circulating strains, such as the H5N1 
Influenzavirus A strains present within Asian poultry and wild birds (Iskander, Strikas, 
Gensheimer, Cox, & Redd, 2013). Current SNS caches contain ample influenza antiviral 
medications to provide emergency prophylaxis to 25% of the US population as well as assets, 
such as ventilators, and personal protective equipment, such as particulate respirators. Authority 
to disperse medical materials rests with both the Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
or the Kansas Department of Emergency Management, either jointly or independently, as needed 
and prioritized by. 
1.4.3 Kansas Pandemic Influenza Strategies 
1.4.3.1 Kansas Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan (KDHE) 
The Kansas Department of Health and Environment maintains the Biological Incident 
Annex (Attachment 1) to the Kansas Response Plan; this annex is also called the Kansas 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan. Similar “biological incident annexes” are 
available at the local level for most jurisdictions. The Response Plan provides an overview of 
statewide, regional, and local strategies to support influenza response and reduce influenza-
related morbidity, mortality, and disorder within the state (“Kansas Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan (Attachment 1),” 2014). The Response Plan also identifies 
planning assumptions and considerations important for preparedness activities, to include 
projections of the effects of a pandemic within the state and nation. The Response Plan further 
identifies response actions associated agencies with designated responsibilities throughout the 
course of a pandemic. KDHE annually updates with revised plans produced each January and 
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containing revisions from pertinent events within the state and nation. Comments on the use of 
this plan within the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic events are within Chapter 3 - Local 
Perceptions on Preparedness. 
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 FIELD EXPERIENCE CHAPTER 2 -
2.1 SUMMARY 
The Wildcat Region (which includes Geary, Pottawatomie, and Riley counties) has an 
increased focus toward addressing an acute stress to the public health system following a large 
accident, disease outbreak, or mass fatality incident. These “medical surge” scenarios are a 
priority for prevention due to the potential magnitude of their effects. Throughout the fieldwork 
assignment at the Riley County Health Department, the study performed highlights the county’s 
capacity to prepare for and respond to a medical surge within the public health system. This 
study was in the context of Riley County with state and national considerations. 
2.2 GOALS 
Short Term:  To develop a report by end of summer 2014that communicates medical surge 
vulnerabilities of Riley County, outline current capacities (resources) and capabilities 
(evaluations) within the jurisdiction, and summarize any recommendations for improvement. 
Long Term:  Countywide improvement in preparedness to respond to a large-scale public 
health emergency, in particular to respond to pandemic influenza. 
2.3 LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
Established learning objectives ensured the activities performed maintained relevance to 
the Masters in Public Health program while gaining a deeper understanding of public health 
practice. The objectives and completion status, listed below, have a more detailed analysis 
provided within this section. 
1. (Completed) Understand the breadth of public health agencies within Riley County and 
collaborating jurisdictions 
2. (Completed) Understand existing emergency standards and evaluation tools applicable to 
public health emergency preparedness and response 
3. (Unable to Execute) Determine applicabilities of Riley County's Hazard Vulnerability 
Analysis within context of field work 
4. (Completed) Be familiar with Riley County response capacities in comparison to similar 
jurisdictions and in contrast to dissimilar jurisdictions 
5. (Completed) Apply MPH curricula topics to activities throughout field work 
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2.3.1 Local Public Health Agencies (Completed)  
It is important to note that a majority of the agencies associated with the public health 
system do not view themselves to be within the public health system. While outwardly not 
identified to be a public health agency (unlike local health departments), each agency is an 
integral part of the system (see Figure 2). The public health system represents a substantial 
fraction of state, local, and private agencies in any given community. Other local collaborations 
have served to better identify agencies that participate within the local public health system. Two 
such collaborations are the Riley County ESF-8 meetings and the Wildcat Region PHEP. This 
section will provide a deeper understanding of the local public health system in place within 
Riley County. 
 
Figure 2: Agencies within the Public Health System 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014) 
2.3.1.1 Riley County Local Public Health System Assessment 
Riley County evaluated the county’s public health system for its effectiveness within the 
dimensions of the 10 Essential Public Health Services. The Riley County Board of County 
Commissioners (BOCC), as the county’s Board of Health (BOH), commissioned the Local 
Public Health System Assessment (LPHSA) via the Riley County Health Department and 
managed by EnVisage Consulting, Inc., a local consulting firm. The LPHSA, performed on June 
11, 2014, convened a diverse and interdisciplinary set of local agencies. Four (4) teams evaluated 
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the public health system (not the Riley County Health Department), with each assessing the 
delivery of the Essential Public Health Services using measures associated with their assigned 
services. Although, the LPHSA results are currently undergoing analysis, a great success of the 
process was a broader understanding by a majority of the agencies present of their role within the 
public health system. While local health and medical agencies were involved in the assessment, 
many agencies not typically associated with public health are integral to the process and the 
system. A sample of those integral agencies not outwardly described as a part of public health 
are: 
 Manhattan Area Chamber of Commerce   League of Women Voters (Manhattan/Riley Co.) 
 Unified School District (USD) 383   Riley County Police Department 
 Riley County Community Corrections   Flint Hills Breadbasket 
2.3.1.2 Riley County Emergency Support Function 8 
Each local jurisdiction has a set of critical emergency support functions (ESFs) that 
follow federal definitions of capabilities to support critical infrastructure. ESF-8 consists of key 
public health and medical agencies within Riley County that each has primary or support roles 
for emergency health and medical operations, to include mass fatality management, 
environmental health, epidemiology and surveillance, and the like. This collaboration of agencies 
has distinct roles in public health emergency operations for preparedness, mitigation, response, 
and recovery actions. The inaugural Riley County ESF-8 Agencies Meeting convened in April 
2014 with subsequent meetings held semi-annually. 
2.3.1.3 Wildcat Region Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
The Wildcat Region formed in the late 1980’s as one of the Kansas Department of Health 
and Environment’s current fifteen Public Health Regions, each grouped by geographic location 
and existing intergovernmental relationships. The Wildcat Region holds monthly public health 
emergency preparedness meetings with key authorities in public health. These open meetings are 
comprised of the Health Department Directors and local preparedness personnel (PHEP 
Coordinators and associates) for Geary, Pottawatomie, and Riley Counties as well as the Fort 
Riley Department of Public Health. The primary focus of these meetings is to support the 
completion of the local health department and Wildcat Region work plans, as subawardees of the 
state cooperative agreements with federal partners. Second to work plan deliverables, the 
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Wildcat Region PHEP collaboration has aims in improving public health preparedness within the 
jurisdiction. 
2.3.2 Public Health Emergency Standards and Evaluation Tools (Completed)  
There are no direct standards to evaluate local public health entities, but many standards 
and evaluation systems are in existence. Of those available, the most widely used standards and 
evaluation systems are the CDC Public Health Preparedness Capabilities, FEMA Target 
Capabilities List and Core Capabilities, Project Public Health Ready criteria and Public Health 
Accreditation Board measures. The CDC Public Health Preparedness Capabilities guide local 
health department and hospital preparedness work plans from state health departments while 
FEMA capabilities guide local government and local emergency management agencies. Project 
Public Health Ready directly evaluates local health department preparedness while Public Health 
Accreditation Board measures evaluate local health department population services within their 
jurisdiction. 
2.3.2.1 Target Capabilities List and Core Capabilities (DHS, FEMA) 
Following the attacks on 9/11, subsequent anthrax attacks, the events of Hurricane 
Katrina, and other national emergencies, the federal government has developed a variety of 
preparedness and response strategies. In December 2003, President Bush issued Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 - National Preparedness to establish the National 
Preparedness Guidelines (the Guidelines) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). The 
Guidelines, produced in 2007, were the start of a national focus toward identifying a capabilities-
based approach for national, all-hazards preparedness, to include the National Planning 
Scenarios, Target Capabilities List (TCL), and Universal Task List. The National Planning 
Scenarios are a list of specific and likely disasters to assist planning and exercises, while the 
Target Capabilities List and Universal Task List identify broad preparedness and response 
capabilities and their included functions. The TCL included a detailed list of thirty-seven 
preparedness capabilities that provide the national preparedness framework. 
In gaining feedback on national preparedness efforts, the 2011 State Preparedness Report 
supported the realignment of the thirty-seven capabilities within the TCL down to thirty-one core 
capabilities, distinct critical elements necessary for the National Preparedness Goal (also 
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developed in 2011). This realignment was necessary since certain overlaps were determined to 
exist within the TCL, while other capabilities were determined to be absent. The resulting core 
capabilities crosswalk to the TCL denotes target capabilities associated with the new core 
capabilities (or no associations). This realignment assisted in the development of the separate, 
but linked, Public Health Preparedness Capabilities by the CDC. 
2.3.2.2 Project Public Health Ready (NACCHO) 
Project Public Health Ready (PPHR), like the aforementioned CDC and FEMA 
programs, is a public health preparedness program developed in 2004 by the National 
Association of County & City Health Officers (NACCHO). PPHR is used to determine 
capability-based approaches to the evaluation of a local health department’s capacities and 
capabilities in planning for, responding to, and recovering from public health emergencies 
(National Association of County & City Health Officials, 2014). PPHR, like PHAB, allows for 
local health departments to receive recognition (similar to accreditation) by meeting criteria set 
in place to support the protection of the public health system. 
2.3.2.3 Public Health Accreditation (PHAB) 
The Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB) was formed in 2007 as a non-profit 
entity to implement and oversee the accreditation of state and local public health departments 
(Public Health Accreditation Board, 2013). PHAB standards and measures, developed by an 
interdisciplinary team of subject matter experts, undergo frequent revision to provide a 
framework for outlining excellence in the public health field. Alongside agency administration, 
jurisdictional assessments, and delivery of public health services, standards and measures are 
available for public health preparedness capabilities. Agencies meeting the public health 
preparedness standards and measures have succeeded in those public health preparedness 
categories. 
2.3.2.4 Public Health Preparedness Capabilities (CDC) 
The aforementioned CDC document, Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National 
Standards for State and Local Planning, created national standards to support capability-based 
planning to better identify gaps in preparedness while providing guidance in the selection of 
jurisdictional priorities and planning for capacity building (Office of Public Health Preparedness 
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and Response, 2011). The CDC developed Public Health Preparedness Capabilities, in part, by 
cross-walking existing PPHR and PHAB measures with FEMA Target Capabilities List and Core 
Capabilities. These standards not only provide the means from which state and local grant 
awardee contract deliverables are developed, but they also describe the critical capabilities and 
functions from which successful public health preparedness and response activities originate. 
Each PHEP capability consists of specific functions, which directly support the 
achievement of the capability, with each function further consisting of tasks which allow for 
achievement of the function. Included with each function are resource elements that are indicated 
as being priority or recommended physical resources or systems, divided into three categories 
(Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 2011): Planning, Skills and Training, and 
Equipment and Technology. Many of the capability functions have CDC-defined performance 
measures to evaluate achievement of the function; annual Performance Measure Specifications 
and Implementation Guidance documents provide information on recently added, recently 
updated, and recently removed performance measures that are in place for the current budget 
period. Additionally, several evaluation tools for specific capabilities are available within the 
Performance Measure Specifications and Implementation Guidance documents. 
2.3.3 Riley County Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (Unable to be Performed)  
The current Hazard Analysis for Riley County does not provide an assessment for 
vulnerability to pandemic influenza or any other pathogen viewed to be of risk to cause 
outbreaks. The Hazard Analysis, completed in January 2012, only gauges the vulnerabilities due 
to a select few biological agents, such as rinderpest or anthrax. The biological agents present 
within the Hazard Analysis are pathogens of high profile but low risk for outbreak. A 
recommendation will be made within FY2015 for Riley County Emergency Management to 
accept an addendum hazard vulnerability analysis that will be more applicable to the actual 
public health risks to the jurisdiction. 
2.3.4 Riley County Response Capacities (Completed)  
Involvement of the Riley County Health Department within the Riley County Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) as a function of ESF-8, assisting in the development of the Riley 
County Emergency Operation Plan (EOP, RCEOP) ESF-8 Annex, and participation within the 
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Northeast [Kansas] Healthcare Coalition (NEHCC) has allowed for an adequate comparison and 
contrast of local response capacities with similar jurisdictions. It is important to note that these 
observations have been completely subjective, as objective comparisons are difficult to obtain. 
Further detail on completion of this objective is available within 2.4.2 Riley County 
Public Health Response Capacities, below. 
2.3.5 MPH Curricula Topics (Completed) 
(see Chapter 4 -Core Competencies and MPH Curricula) 
2.4 ACTIVITIES PERFORMED 
A set of activities developed at the outset of the field experience aim to meet the 
aforementioned objectives. As the field experience continued, updating of these activities 
occurred with several new activities added along the way. Activities listed below include their 
completion statuses with a more detailed analysis provided within this section. 
1. (Completed) Compile a list of key public health stakeholders to be affected by a medical 
surge; evaluate by agencies involved in emergency capacity 
2. (Completed) Determine Riley County public health response capacities 
3. (Partially Completed) Evaluate Riley County by available capability standards 
4. (Partially Completed) Assess Riley County vulnerability to medical surge 
5. (Recently Added, Partially Completed) Perform systematic review on basis of research 
question: How would improved public health preparedness reduce burden to the public 
health and healthcare systems following an increase in influenza-like illness in Kansas? 
2.4.1 Emergency Support Function 8 Agency Listing (Completed)  
Development of contact lists for ESF-8 agencies occurred by the resolution of this 
fieldwork assignment. These contact lists provided assistance in determining agencies for 
response consideration as well as supporting work for the PHEP Coordinator. These lists 
developed over the course of the fieldwork assignment with discovery of agency information. 
A list of core agencies that are key to ESF-8 is compiled within Appendix B -ESF-8 
Contact Lists (see Table 1). A list of support agencies for ESF-8 (as currently identified) is 
compiled within Appendix B -ESF-8 Contact Lists. 
21 
2.4.2 Riley County Public Health Response Capacities (Completed)  
2.4.2.1 Riley County Emergency Support Function 8 Activities 
The Riley County Health Department is the Primary and Coordinating Agency for ESF-8. 
This tasks RCHD with taking on a liaison role between health and medical response agencies as 
well as providing support and guidance to those agencies in preparedness and response activities. 
In reviewing and updating the RCEOP, the ESF-8 Annex proved to be a valuable document 
outlining the capabilities and capacities for local public health and medical emergency response. 
The ESF-8 Annex provides an overview of emergency operations under the responsibility of 
health and medical entities and maintains a list of agency responsibilities in fulfilling those 
actions. 
Riley County emergency response agencies seem to perform excellently within their own 
defined response areas. Additionally, Riley County Emergency Medical Services (RCEMS), 
Manhattan Fire Department (MFD), Riley County Police Department (RCPD), and Riley County 
Emergency Management (RCEM) (to include Riley County Fire District #1) have developed 
strong relationships over the years and often respond to typical emergencies as a joint task force 
with each agency providing its own unique assistance. Emergency response in Riley County does 
not always properly utilize some agencies or personnel critical in response, including the Health 
Department, Riley County Coroner, and local clinicians, among many others. This is a difficult 
culture to overcome and wrought with substantial obstacle to preparedness efforts, especially for 
public health and pandemic preparedness efforts. 
It is of the author’s opinion that Riley County is at the average level or slightly above 
average in response capacity, due to the availability of resources within Manhattan for 
emergency services. The Riley County Emergency Manager (and RCEM by extension) 
collaborates well within the county and with adjacent jurisdictions, an attribute that is not present 
within many other jurisdictions. 
2.4.2.2 Northeast [Kansas] Healthcare Coalition 
The Northeast Healthcare Coalition (NEHCC) organized in 2013 as a national effort to 
provide regional bridges between local planning and response and the equivalent statewide 
planning and response (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2010, 
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p. 134). The NEHCC, along with other regions’ coalitions, brings together public health and 
medical entities to collaborate on preparedness efforts. Coalition meetings are a great forum of 
discussion and allow for a limited understanding of other public health preparedness efforts 
within the region. The healthcare coalitions operate similar to local ESF-8 structures, but are 
more advisory in nature
3
. 
2.4.3 Evaluation of Riley County Capabilities (Partially Completed)  
Objective evaluations are typically time- and cost-intensive. Additionally, many 
evaluations and assessments on preparedness and response capabilities require an exercise or 
actual incident to view functions performed (see 2.3.2 Public Health Emergency Standards and 
Evaluation Tools for applicable standards). The desired evaluation of Riley County for this 
fieldwork assignment would have originated within the CDC Public Health Preparedness 
Capability 10 – Medical Surge. No PHEP performance measures yet exist for the Medical Surge 
capability. After-action reporting from an October 2013 preparedness exercise and the June 2014 
LPHSA are limited evaluations of Riley County capabilities. 
2.4.3.1 Evaluation of Riley County EOC (2013 KDA FAD Exercise) 
Select Riley County agencies participated within a functional (operational) exercise, RIP 
STOP 2013, in October 2013 that allowed for the testing of some capabilities. This exercise was 
a follow-up to a February tabletop exercise and is a part of a series of Kansas Department of 
Agriculture (KDA)-sponsored exercises for statewide capacity building. The KDA organized the 
exercise exercise, based on the scenario of a widespread outbreak of foot and mouth disease 
(FMD), to include federal and state partners as well as the adjacent Pottawatomie County (Pott. 
Co.) and Kansas State University (KSU). The exercise had primary foci on restricted and 
permitted movement of livestock in the event of disease outbreak. 
During the two-day exercise, the Riley County EOC activated and organized with ESFs 
pertinent to the capabilities evaluated. Throughout the duration of the exercise, exercise 
artificialities may have inhibited proper responses by the EOC. In a majority of local incidents 
                                                 
3
 Discussions are taking place at this time to determine the necessity and extent of any operational capacities of 
healthcare coalitions. As the coalitions are not official entities or extensions of state or local agencies, their 
operational capacities currently only exist in liaison and resource provision activities. 
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and disasters, responses at the local level with emergency managers identify operational 
objectives and organizing response; once resources exhaust at the local level, state assistance 
becomes awarded, followed by federal assistance. For agricultural emergencies (and few other 
major national emergencies), this response scheme is drastically different, as the KDA (or other 
state/federal agency in other major national emergencies) is in command of the incident and 
establishes objectives for the local responders. As this scheme is uncommon to emergency 
responses, local objectives were not provided in a timely manner, in which case the EOC 
identified its own objectives to address the exercise scenario injects. 
In the months following the exercise, KDA produced an exercise after-action report. This 
after-action report may serve as an evaluation of some identified capabilities. A summary of the 
after-action report’s findings specific to Riley County operations is as follows: 
Operational Communications 
 (Positive) Communications within the EOC were excellent 
 (Positive) Information sharing was accomplished between response agencies (KSU, Pott. 
Co., Fort Riley) 
 (Negative) Riley County did not provide a liaison to KDA’s Incident Command (not 
requested) 
 (Negative) Information sharing tools not properly utilized (or not utilized at all) to 
support situational awareness 
Operational Coordination 
 (Positive) ESFs were well represented within EOC and responded based on activation 
procedures 
 (Positive) Utilization of KDA and KSU liaisons supported situational awareness 
 (Positive) Riley County GIS provided excellent mapping, as requested 
 (Negative) EOC lacks capabilities and capacities, in part due to the limitations of the 
EOC’s housing facility 
Public Information and Warning 
 (Positive) EOC established a Joint Information Center (JIC) amongst local public 
information officers (PIOs) which supported timely public information and warning 
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Summary 
This evaluation was favorable for Riley County, in regards to communications and 
information sharing (ESF-2 and PHEP Capability 6), emergency operations coordination (ESF-5 
and PHEP Capability 3), and public information and warning (ESF-15 and PHEP Capability 4). 
This exercise did not significantly evaluate Riley County’s capabilities in response to disease 
outbreak or a medical surge. 
2.4.3.2 Local Public Health System Assessment 
The June 2014 LPHSA provided an excellent evaluation of Riley County’s public health 
system (see 2.3.1.1 Riley County Local Public Health System Assessment for more details on the 
assessment). Each team facilitating the assessment moderated a group of local public health 
agency representatives (20-35 per team) who collaboratively evaluated the effectiveness of the 
Riley County public health system to deliver the 10 Essential Public Health Services. The 
Essential Services group into three (3) Core Public Health Functions (as seen in Figure 3): 
Assessment, Policy Development, and Assurance. 
Figure 4 provides a summary of results from the LPHSA. Each Essential Service has a set 
of Model Standards outlining functions critical to the delivery of the Essential Service. 
Following discussion on the Essential Service and the Model Standard itself, participants were 
asked to evaluate Riley County’s activity in performing service-specific functions by providing 
an assessment response option (with associated quantity of activity) : Optimal Activity (76-
100%), Significant Activity (51-75%), Moderate Activity (26-50%), Minimal Activity (1-25%), 
and No Activity (0%). 
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Figure 3: The 10 Essential Public Health Services 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014) 
 
Figure 4: Performance Scores by 10 Essential Public Health Services 
(EnVisage Consulting, Inc., 2014) 
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The preliminary results from the LPHSA indicate significant gaps in the delivery of the 
Essential Services within Riley County; overall scores were only slightly above 50% of activity. 
The following Essential Services indicated only moderate activity (26-50%) to deliver services: 
ES-1 – Monitor Health Status, ES-3 – Educate/Empower, ES-5 – Develop Policies/Plans, ES-8 – 
Assure Competent Workforce, ES-9 – Evaluate Services, and ES-10 – Research/Innovation. The 
following Essential Services indicated significant activity (51-75%) to deliver services: ES-4 – 
Mobilize Partnerships, ES-6 – Enforce Laws, and ES-7 – Link to Health Services. The only 
Essential Service to show optimal activity (76-100%) was ES-2 – Diagnose and Investigate. 
This may provide a fair assessment of public health preparedness in Riley County. The 
author views the public health workforce to be somewhat ill prepared as a unit (not just RCHD) 
to prepare for and respond to emerging public health issues (ES-8) with identified gaps in 
planning and local public health authorities (ES-5). Additionally, the performance assessments 
(and discussion notes) specific to interagency communication and collaboration showed 
significant gaps:  interagency communication and coordination may be the area in most 
need of improvement. The LPHSA, however, showed a tremendous positive response for the 
Riley County public health system’s ability to diagnose and investigate health problems/hazards 
(ES-2); disease identification, epidemiology, and investigation may be strengths within Riley 
County. 
2.4.4 Assessment of Riley County Vulnerability to Medical Surge (Partially Completed) 
The assessment of Riley County’s vulnerability to a medical surge was more difficult to 
accomplish than originally assumed. A sudden influx of patients to a medical facility because of 
disease outbreak, mass trauma incident, or other significant event can cause disruption and even 
arrest of the provision of services. This is a significant issue to public health planning, as a 
medical surge may happen at any time. Although the wide variety of potential sources which 
may cause a medical surge are known, the means of which to dampen the effects to an individual 
facility, let alone the public health system, are difficult to identify and are even more 
complicated to prepare for and mitigate. 
From a subjective viewpoint, Riley County is significantly vulnerable to medical surge. 
The following considerations support this viewpoint: 
27 
 The Wildcat Region (Geary, Pottawatomie, and Riley Counties) has an atypically mobile 
population due to student and military housing and activity between jurisdictions; 
 Riley County’s population significantly grows as a result of signature events; 
 More than 12,000 per game in basketball home game attendance (K-State o
Athletics, 2014b), 
 Approximately 50,000 per game in football home game attendance (K-State o
Athletics, 2014a), 
 Approximately 50,000 per day in Country Stampede attendance (4 days) (Country o
Stampede, 2014), 
 Unknown attendance in Fake Patty’s Day (may be 10,000-50,000 persons), o
 K-State’s Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI) and Veterinary Diagnostic Lab (VDL) 
may potentially increase risks to public health by providing research or analysis on 
pathogens which may become freed from containment (National Bio and Agro-Defense 
Facility (NBAF) development notwithstanding); 
 No system is currently in place to support the use of alternate care sites; and 
 Lack of coordination, education, and training for identification and response to medical 
surge events within public health system, as identified within 2.4.2.1 - Riley County 
Emergency Support Function 8 Activities. 
Interviews conducted on key stakeholders provide insight on perceptions of Riley 
County’s vulnerability to medical surge following the events of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza 
Pandemic; these interviews are within Chapter 3 -Local Perceptions on Preparedness. 
2.4.5 Systematic Review of Research Question (Partially Completed)  
A research question guides the systematic review within this report as well as to guide the 
development of this report. Although the systematic review would be too time-intensive for this 
fieldwork assignment, the research question is useful for a future systematic review in order to 
determine relevance and quality of literature used and was a formal statement of the purpose of 
the study. A research question has the following components: 
 Population(s) of interest:  the jurisdiction being evaluated within the systematic review 
or population samples or populations directly applicable to the jurisdiction of the study; 
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 Intervention(s) in use:  therapies, prevention strategies, or response strategies used to 
prevent/improve adverse health outcomes; and 
 Desired outcome(s):  end results of studies which support findings of literature review. 
The research question was determined to be: 
How would improved public health preparedness reduce burden to the public health and 
healthcare systems following an increase in influenza-like illness in Kansas? 
where public health  preparedness would entail the development of partnerships or 
relationships within the public health system, provision of  health/medical/human 
resources, and  prophylaxis of the population in advance of an influenza pandemic, and 
where the public health and healthcare systems are to include medical care, emergency 
services, primary care facilities, and other entities concerned with threats to the health of 
the population (public health). The public health entities of interest in this study are to be 
medical care, emergency services, and health departments, and 
where a burden to the public health and healthcare systems would be an acute stress on 
public health and medical services following an incident or disease outbreak, and 
where influenza-like illness (ILI) would be the medical diagnosis of possible influenza or 
other illness causing common symptoms. A pandemic influenza, diagnosed as influenza-
like illness, is the stress of interest to public health in this report. 
Following the development of the research question, the development of a systematic 
review project was assisted by guidance from Sargeant et al. Using methods within A Guide to 
Conducting Systematic Reviews in Agri-Food Public Health, a list of search terms was developed 
for the systematic review (Sargeant, Del, Amezcua, Raj, & Waddell, 2005). The search terms in 
use were both general and specific terms to support appraisal of literature which appropriately 
met the population(s) of choice, intervention(s) in use, and desired outcome(s) (see Appendix D -
Search Terms for Systematic Review) (Sargeant et al., 2005). Using these search terms, a search 
strategy developed in order to maintain specificity of returned articles throughout use of multiple 
databases.  To keep track of database searches and results, a template developed to ensure 
reproducibility of searches (see Appendix E -Search Strategy Template for Systematic Review). 
Lastly, a tool, developed for the field experience, assessed literature adherence to the 
research question as well in the extraction of useful data (see Appendix F -Assessment and 
Extraction Tool for Systematic Review). This tool successfully evaluated literature obtained with 
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the aforementioned search strategy for its relevance to the research question. Literature deemed 
to appropriately fall within the bounds of the research question provided comparable data for 
analysis within the systematic review. This final portion of the research review projected a need 
of much more time than available for the fieldwork assignment. A successful systematic review 
may follow the groundwork laid herein. 
2.5 PRODUCTS DEVELOPED 
At the outset of the field experience, a set of products projected for completion at the end 
of the fieldwork assignment. The products and their completion statuses follow below, with a 
more detailed analysis provided within this section. 
1. (Completed) List of public health stakeholders to be affected by a medical surge; 
categorization by agencies able to respond to public health emergency 
2. (Partially Completed) Evaluation of Riley County by pertinent capability standards; 
crosswalk overlapping standard sets 
3. (Completed) MPH Report on Riley County's vulnerability to medical surge and the 
available public health response capabilities; include recommendations for improvement 
planning 
4. (Recently Added, Partially Complete) Systematic review of literature pertaining to a 
medical surge caused by increases in influenza-like illness in Kansas 
2.5.1 Categorized List of Public Health Stakeholders in Riley County (Completed) 
See 2.4.1 Emergency Support Function 8 Agency Listing for work performed. A list of 
core agencies that are key to ESF-8 is compiled within Appendix B -ESF-8 Contact Lists (see 
Table 1). A list of support agencies for ESF-8 (as currently identified) is compiled within 
Appendix B -ESF-8 Contact Lists (see Table 2). 
2.5.2 Evaluation of Riley County by Pertinent Standards (Partially Completed) 
This activity is partially completed since objective evaluations are typically time- and 
cost-intensive. Additionally, many evaluations and assessments on preparedness and response 
capabilities require an exercise or actual incident to view functions performed. The desired 
evaluation of Riley County for this fieldwork assignment would have originated within the CDC 
Public Health Preparedness Capability 10 – Medical Surge. Unfortunately, no PHEP 
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performance measures exist for the Medical Surge capability. See 2.3.2 Public Health 
Emergency Standards and Evaluation Tools for applicable standards and 2.4.3 Evaluation of 
Riley County Capabilities for assessments performed and descriptions on evaluated capabilities. 
2.5.3 Systematic Review of Research Question (Partially Completed) 
Although the systematic review was too time-intensive to complete during this fieldwork 
assignment, the research question is useful for a future systematic review in order to determine 
relevance and quality of literature used and was a formal statement of the purpose of the study. 
Several products followed development of the systematic review: 
See Appendix D -Search Terms for Systematic Review 
See Appendix E -Search Strategy Template for Systematic Review 
See Appendix F -Assessment and Extraction Tool for Systematic Review 
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 LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON PREPAREDNESS CHAPTER 3 -
During the course of the fieldwork, several key public health figures provided insight on 
their experiences and perceptions on the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. The events of the 2009 
global H1N1 outbreaks were the focus of these interviews, due to their recent occurrence as well 
as the potential stress to the public health system that could occur with such events. The three 
persons interviewed were Michael McNulty, Homeland Security Coordinator for the Kansas 
Department of Health and Environment (KDHE); Michelle Rutherford, Assistant Director of 
Riley County Emergency Medical Services (RCEMS); and Cary Herl, Medical Director of the 
Riley County Health Department (RCHD) and local physician with the Candlewood Medical 
Group as well as Mercy Regional Health Center (MRHC). Each person had a unique role and 
perspective on the outbreaks. 
KDHE has been involved in pandemic planning since 2006, to include some exercises 
prior to 2009 (see 1.4.3.1 Kansas Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan 
(KDHE)). The version of the plan in use for the H1N1 events addressed “worst case scenarios 
such as the 1918 influenza pandemic,” indicated McNulty. This is common with emergency 
plans since many plans account for “highest impact [incidents] and not necessarily highest risk 
incidents” (i.e., anthrax over influenza). This resulted in interventions that were “drastic 
measures.” Local (Riley County) responses indicated little to no pandemic preparedness planning 
or exercises had taken place prior to the 2009 outbreaks. 
KDHE’s new state health officer, Dr. Jason Eberhart-Phillips, was hired in March 2009, 
just prior to the first confirmed April reports of H1N1 in Kansas (Kansas Department of Health 
and Environment, 2010). Initial actions by KDHE were to activate a branch within the state’s 
Incident Command to support disease containment operations. Local actions were of lesser 
extent, with few response actions taken. “Cases were treated as regular influenza,” said Herl. 
Rutherford added that EMS providers were “more vigilant about identifying patients with 
symptoms conclusive of flu” as well as situations where airborne virus was suspected present. 
Subsequent responses were less hectic as the heightened awareness “frenzy” from the media 
dissipated. KDHE maintained emergency operations until the outbreaks ceased in February 
2010. 
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The newly envisioned electronic system for statewide medical material logistics, the 
Kansas Countermeasure Response Administration (KS-CRA), rushed into development in order 
to track and inventory vaccines, medical materials, and SNS supplies. The first field-testing of 
this system began shortly after the initial outbreaks. This allowed the state to release medical 
materials to local jurisdictions; Riley County received SNS supplies in May 2009. Herl stated 
vaccinations began earlier than in prior seasons and were “provided as soon as received.” KDHE 
was able to foster good partnerships with pharmacies who, in turn, worked with both insured and 
uninsured populations via different methodologies; McNulty noted that working with pharmacies 
to assist in the provision of antivirals to un- and underinsured populations was of the most 
significant impact to reducing public health burden. SNS medical countermeasures in use were 
antivirals (3/4 from state cache and 1/4 from the CDC) and medical countermeasure provisions 
were N95 respirators. 
Internal briefings within KDHE were difficult, as communications attempted to reach the 
very many KDHE employees within the nine offices across the state, six satellite offices, and in 
the field. Communications to the public were also insufficient, as noted by both McNulty and 
Herl. The development of the KS Public Health Calls addressed this issue. The Public Health 
Calls started with local health departments and transitioned to hospitals and then others for 
situation reports (daily at height of outbreak cases). McNulty noted this to be “an opportunity to 
encompass the vast reach of public health.” Internal communications improved across the agency 
because of the issues present during the H1N1 outbreaks. 
Overwhelmingly, persons interviewed indicated that the pandemic events did not pose a 
significant stress to the system (i.e.,, no significant medical surge events following influenza 
cases).  “The outbreaks were not very bad,” said Herl, “so not much chance to learn lessons.” 
McNulty added that KDHE annual revisions of the Response Plan attempted to “improve 
scalability of response operations” designated within the plan; overhaul of the plan followed the 
influenza pandemics. 
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 CORE COMPETENCIES AND MPH CURRICULA CHAPTER 4 -
4.1 CORE COMPETENCIES 
4.1.1 Biostatistics 
There were no opportunities within the context of the fieldwork assignment to utilize 
biostatistics methods, although simple statistical methods have been in use throughout 
employment. The core curriculum Biostatistics course was more than sufficient in preparing me 
for descriptive or inferential means of identifying statistically significant data trends. With the 
increased focus on collaborative efforts in epidemiology and surveillance within the Wildcat 
Region, there will be future opportunities to utilize these skills. 
4.1.2 Environmental Health Sciences 
As the lead investigator for Elevated Blood Lead cases in children and adults, there has 
been much opportunity to educate clients in the toxicological aspects of lead exposure as well as 
the health outcomes following development of elevated blood lead. Clients are educated in 
means to reduce lead exposure as well as treatments to mitigate harm. 
Public interest following open burnings within the area have allowed for presentations to 
the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC), as well as the development of press releases, to 
educate the public on air quality and adverse effects following air pollution. These presentations 
have included information on assessments methods and regulations in place and in force by 
KDHE and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to include environmental impact 
statements (EIS). 
4.1.3 Epidemiology 
Although the localities do not typically perform epidemiological calculations (generally 
performed by state epidemiologists), standard reports of disease prevalence and incidence are 
easily created using the KDHE EpiTrax system. This system allows for the development of 
reports providing information and filtering by any data category which may be entered (age, 
gender/sex, disease, date condition reported to public health, etc.). There may be future 
opportunities to utilize these skills following the increased focus in epidemiology and 
surveillance within the Wildcat Region. 
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Appropriate conclusions made center on risk of infection by diseases identified to be of 
significant risk, such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome and measles, which were determined 
to be of low risk to the local population. 
The Riley County Health Department has focused multiple discussions on the 
dissemination of epidemiological data. For instance, information disseminated to providers may 
not be appropriate to be disseminated to the general public, as there may be misconceptions on 
the meanings and interpretations of the data (i.e., giving disease . The evaluation of 
epidemiology and surveillance data for public health use and dissemination to the public will be 
a focus of the newly developed RCHD Epi Team. 
4.1.4 Health Services Administration 
During fieldwork and employment at the Riley County Health Department, there have 
been many instances to observe the many roles and responsibilities within the public health 
workforce. With collaborations such as the Wildcat Region PHEP, the Public Health Advisory 
Council, and the Local Public Health System Assessment, there are varieties of public health 
stakeholders within the public health system. The collaborative efforts have provided an 
excellent opportunity to observe the many dimensions of public health. 
Monthly public health calls within Kansas, facilitated by the KDHE, as well as 
administrative discussions from KDHE and the Kansas Association of Local Health Departments 
(KALHD) have provided excellent forums for understanding the broader demographic and 
legal/ethical components of public health. Being a part of the Health Department has allowed the 
opportunity to view the administrative efforts within public health. 
4.1.5 Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Social and behavioral theories are useful in understanding reports from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) as well as other health indicator and health outcome 
assessments on the population. These have been useful in additional endeavors such as smoking 
cessation. Underserved and indigent populations are primary populations of interest served by 
the Health Department. Services provided to these clients often entail education on social and 
behavioral factors that contribute to the health of individuals. 
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4.2 EMPHASIS AREA COMPETENCIES 
4.2.1 Pathogens/Pathogenic Mechanisms 
The understanding of different pathogenic mechanisms has been of benefit in discussing 
disease risk to the jurisdiction. It has also assisted in the understanding of prevention, 
disinfection, and treatment of specific diseases. 
4.2.2 Host Response to Pathogens/Immunology 
There have been many opportunities to discuss the merits of vaccination as they pertain 
to immune response and risk of disease. The recent resurgence of measles within the United 
States has offered the opportunity to observe the importance of vaccination as well as the 
detriments for unvaccinated populations. 
4.2.3 Environmental/Ecological Influences 
An excellent example of environmental/ecological influences on disease epidemiology 
would come from local tularemia (Francisella tularensis) cases. Actual tularemia rates are often 
under-reported since they often infect animals and reporting systems for animal cases (as well as 
ease of diagnosis) is not as robust as the EpiTrax system for human cases. The understanding of 
the underlying prevalence and influences of the environment/ecosystem are integral in projecting 
actual tularemia rates. These influences are also important in food defense and food safety as 
enteric disease outbreaks are often preventable with the proper methods. 
4.2.4 Disease Surveillance/Quantitative Methods 
Disease surveillance and epidemiological methods in place at KDHE and the EpiTrax 
system manage and quantify disease risks and disease prevalence within the jurisdiction. Patient 
data entered allows for determinations of relative risk between populations using a data analysis 
function of EpiTrax. 
4.2.5 Effective Communication 
This competency has been widely utilized within the employment and fieldwork 
assignment at the Health Department. Many public health and preparedness presentations have 
been made by the author to the Northeast Region within the NEHCC (as Planning Chair) and 
locally within the Health Department, ESF-8 Agencies Meeting, BOCC/BOH meetings, and at 
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KSU. These presentations have involved public health preparedness needs, environmental health 
concerns, infectious disease risks, and the like. There have been many opportunities to evaluate 
these competencies as this may be the most important competency to be learned. 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CHAPTER 5 -
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
Influenza viruses are constantly changing, which requires constant characterization to 
provide early identification of emerging strains with pandemic potential. This inhibition of 
surveillance is also complicated since influenza reporting by public health entities and healthcare 
providers is voluntary; influenza viruses, other than any identified emerging strains, are not 
reportable within current Kansas statutes and regulations. Additionally, influenza surveillance 
methods cannot accurately determine the number of people ill due to influenza during influenza 
seasons, but surveillance may help determine demographic and geographic trends in influenza 
activity. National surveillance is made possible by use of a complex network of eight 
complementary surveillance systems within five categories and obtaining reports from more than 
145 laboratories, 2,900 outpatient healthcare providers, vital statistics offices in 122 cities, and 
influenza surveillance coordinators and epidemiologists from all state, local, and territorial health 
departments. 
This report provides a detailed report on specific capabilities and capacities in public 
health preparedness within Riley County. The capabilities, capacities, and assessments within 
this report are in the context of a threat following an influenza pandemic. This report provides 
observances on local public health agencies, some past agency responses, and some beliefs on 
agency preparedness. This report also identifies existing emergency standards, response 
capacities, and evaluation tools in use within the nation. Finally, the report offers a brief 
assessment on Riley County’s vulnerability to medical surge following outbreaks of pandemic 
influenza. 
Resultant of the Local Public Health System Assessment, a strength within Riley County 
is in its disease identification, epidemiology, and investigation. Additionally, local emergency 
response agencies have shown great capabilities and capacities in preparing for and responding 
to public health emergencies, with capabilities tested favorably for information sharing, 
emergency operations coordination, and public information and warning. The author, however, 
views the broad Riley County public health system as much less prepared and capable than those 
core agencies. Interagency communication and coordination are especially in need of 
development as well as exercising in accordance with existing plans. If the local public health 
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system is unable to respond as necessary to a complex public health emergency, such as an 
influenza pandemic, the local infrastructure may fail. Well-developed public health preparedness 
and self-efficacy in advance of these public health emergencies are key to the success of the 
jurisdiction. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current Riley County Hazard Analysis does not adequately address public health 
risks to the jurisdiction. Although important, it would not be appropriate to request a new 
analysis since the current document is approximately two years old. The author recommends that 
Riley County Emergency Management accept an addendum public health vulnerability analysis, 
once completed, to convey the more likely public health risks to the jurisdiction. The author will 
pursue this as a 2014-2015 objective and will develop the necessary hazard vulnerability analysis 
for biological events in need of attention. 
The partially complete systematic review may be of quality and applicability to the 
county, region, or any other appropriate jurisdiction. The author recommends that the systematic 
review, if relevant and applicable, continue as outlined by Sargeant et al and by a team of at least 
two individuals to prevent unnecessary bias. 
Opportunity exists to perform a thorough evaluation of the Riley County public health 
system (or primarily the Riley County Health Department) by the standards and evaluation tools 
presented within this report. The author recommends that the CDC Public Health Preparedness 
Capabilities guide preparedness planning and administration within the Riley County Health 
Department; any relevant evaluations may follow, as available, using the annual budget period 
Performance Measures and Guidance documents. The author further recommends that the Riley 
County Health Department consider using the NACCHO Project Public Health Ready as a 
framework for the development of a quality Public Health Emergency Preparedness program. 
The assessment of Riley County’s vulnerability to a medical surge was more difficult to 
accomplish than originally assumed. A sudden influx of patients to a medical facility because of 
disease outbreak, mass trauma incident, or other significant event can cause disruption and even 
arrest of the provision of services. This is a significant issue to public health planning, as a 
medical surge may happen at any time. The author recommends that the Riley County Health 
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Department pursue medical surge planning appropriate to the jurisdiction, to include alternate 
care site facility considerations, staffing of alternate care sites, medical material and medical 
countermeasure stockpiling needs, and standard operating guides with associated attachments to 
support medical surge responses. This planning should be in direct collaboration with Riley 
County Emergency Medical Services and Mercy Regional Health Center (Via Christi). 
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APPENDIX A - KANSAS REPORTABLE DISEASES FORM 
Obtained from Kansas Department of Health and Environment’s Disease Reporting for Health 
Professionals webpage (2014):  http://www.kdheks.gov/epi/disease_reporting.html 
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APPENDIX B - ESF-8 CONTACT LISTS 
Table 1: ESF-8 Core Agencies 
Type Agency Agency Address City, State Zipcode Agency Ph. Agency Fax 
Behavioral Health Pawnee Mental Health 2001 Claflin Road Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-4310   
City Government City of Manhattan, City Hall 1101 Poyntz Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-2404 (785) 587-2409 
County Government Riley County Clerk's Office 110 Courthouse Plaza, Room B118 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Emergency Management Riley County Emergency Management 115 N. 4th St. Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-6333 (785) 537-6338 
Environmental Health Riley County Environmental Health 110 Courthouse Plaza, Room B-212 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-6332 (785) 537-6331 
Fire Services City of Riley Fire Department  902 West Walnut Street Riley, Kansas 66531 (785) 485-2802   
Fire Services Manhattan Fire Department 2000 Denison Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-4504 (785) 587-4513 
Fire Services Riley County Fire District #1 115 N. 4th St. Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-6333 (785) 537-6338 
Law Enforcement Riley County Police Department 1001 S. Seth Child Road Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-2112   
Medical Examiner KS 21st Judicial District Coroner 1133 College Avenue, Building B Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 539-5363 (785) 539-4888 
Medical, Emergency 
Mercy Regional Health Center, Emergency 
Department 
1823 College Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 776-3322   
Medical, Emergency Riley County EMS 2011 Claflin Road Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 539-3535 (785) 565-6593 
Medical, Hospital Lafene Health Center 1105 Sunset Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 532-6544   
Medical, Hospital Mercy Regional Health Center 1823 College Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 776-3322   
Medical, Provider Candlewood Medical Group 3260 Kimball Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 539-0800 (785) 539-0811 
Medical, Surgical Manhattan Surgical Hospital 1829 College Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 776-5100 (785) 539-6449 
Pharmacy Barry's Drug Center 414 Poyntz Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 776-8833   
Public Safety, Animal City of Manhattan Animal Control 605 Levee Drive Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-2783   
Public Works Riley County Public Works 6215 Tuttle Creek Boulevard Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 537-6330 (785) 565-6286 
Special Populations, 
Children 
USD 383, Department of Communications 2031 Poyntz Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-2000   
Special Populations, 
College 
KSU Division of Public Safety 108 Edwards Hall 
Kansas State University, 
66506 
(785) 532-5856 (785) 532-1981 
Special Populations, 
Elderly 
Riley County Council on Aging         
State Government KS Department of Agriculture 109 SW 9th Street Topeka, Kansas 66612 (785) 296-3556   
State Government KS Medical Society 623 SW 10th Avenue Topeka, Kansas 66612 (785) 235-2383   
Transit 
Flint Hills Area Transportation Agency 
(ATA) 
5815 Marlatt Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-6345 (785) 537-6327 
Veterinary, Emergency Riley County Animal Response Team         
Volunteer, Medical American Red Cross         
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Table 2: ESF-8 Support Agencies 
Type Agency Agency Address City, State, Zipcode Agency Ph. Agency Fax 
City Government Manhattan City Commission 1101 Poyntz Ave. Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-2404   
Civic Resources Manhattan Public Library 629 Poyntz Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
County Government 
Riley County Board of County 
Commissioners 
115 N. 4th St. Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 565-6202   
County Government Riley County Clerk's Office 110 Courthouse Plaza, Room B118 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
County Government Riley County Counselor's Office 115 N. 4th Street, 3rd Floor West Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
County Government Riley County Research and Extension 110 Courthouse Plaza, Room B220 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Fire Services Manhattan Fire Department 2000 Denison Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-4504 (785) 587-4513 
Medical Examiner 
Kansas State Veterinary Diagnostic 
Laboratory 
1800 Denison Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66506     
Medical, Dental Dental Associates of Manhattan 1133 College Avenue, Suite D-202 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 539-7401   
Medical, Dental Dentistry By Design 1110 Westport Drive Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 539-2314   
Medical, Dental Flint Hills Endodontics 1133 College Avenue, Suite D-110 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 770-3300   
Medical, Dental Little Apple Pediatric Dentistry, LLC 1133 College Avenue, Suite D-164 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Medical, Dental Manhattan Dental 2745 Pembrook Place Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Medical, Dental Randy Davis Dentistry 1133 College Avenue, Suite A-103 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Medical, Dental The Dental Health Group LLP 1640 Charles Place, Suite 101 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Medical, Dental Tindall Orthodontics 1415 Westport Landing Place Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Medical, Emergency K+STAT Urgent Care 930 Hayes Drive Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 565-0016 (785) 565-0003 
Medical, Emergency Riley County EMS 2011 Claflin Road Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 539-3535 (785) 565-6593 
Medical, Hospital Irwin Army Community Hospital 600 Caisson Road Fort Riley, Kansas 66442     
Medical, Hospital Lafene Health Center 1105 Sunset Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 532-6544 (785) 532-3425 
Medical, Hospital Mercy Regional Health Center 1823 College Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 776-3322 (785) 587-5465 
Medical, Provider Candlewood Medical Group 3260 Kimball Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 539-0800 (785) 539-0811 
Medical, Provider Flint Hills Community Clinic 401 Houston Street, Suite C Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 323-4351 (785) 323-4359 
Medical, Provider Manhattan Primary Care 1133 College Avenue, Suite A-211 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 320-5000 (888) 524-2251 
Medical, Provider Meadowlark Hills Medical Professionals 2121 Meadowlark Road Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-1900 (785) 537-6240 
Medical, Provider Medical Associates of Manhattan 1133 College Avenue, Suite E-110 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-2651 (785) 537-2975 
Medical, Provider Mosier and Mosier Family Physicians LLP 2900 Amherst Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 539-8700   
Medical, Provider Pediatric Associates 1133 College Avenue, Suite B-210 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-9030 (785) 537-3334 
Medical, Provider Primary Care Physicians of Manhattan 1133 College Avenue, Suite C-143 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-4940 (785) 537-0836 
Medical, Provider Stonecreek Family Physicians 4101 Anderson Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 587-4101 (785) 587-9090 
Medical, Provider Women’s Health Group 1620 Charles Place Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
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Medical, School Riley County USD 378 117 N. Remmele, PO Box 248 Riley, Kansas 66531 (785) 485-4010   
Medical, Surgical Konza Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery 1133 College Avenue, Suite C-200 Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Medical, Surgical Manhattan Surgical Hospital 1829 College Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 776-5100   
Medical, Urology Associated Urologists, ASC 1133 College Avenue, Suite G-100 Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-8710   
Special Pop., Children Head Start Program 1700 Leavenworth Street Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Special Pop., Children 
Kansas Department for Children and 
Families 
2709 Amherst Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502     
Special Pop., Children 
Manhattan-Ogden USD 383 
Communications Office 
2031 Poyntz Avenue Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 587-2000   
Special Pop., College 
Kansas State University, Masters in Public 
Health Program 
311 Trotter Hall  Manhattan, Kansas 66506     
Special Pop., Elderly Autumn Hills 7621 Falcon Rd. Riley, Kansas 66531 (785) 485-2777   
Special Pop., Elderly Homecare and Hospice 3801 Vanesta Dr Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 537-0688   
Special Pop., Elderly Homestead Assisted Living 1923 Little Kitten Ave. Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 776-1772   
Special Pop., Elderly Meadowlark Hills Retirement 2121 Meadowlark Rd. Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 537-4610   
Special Pop., Elderly Rehabcare Group 409 W. Barton Rd. 
Leonardville, Kansas 
66531 
(785) 293-5586   
Special Pop., Elderly Stoneybrook Assisted Living 2029 Little Kitten Ave. Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 537-1065   
Special Pop., Elderly Stoneybrook Retirement Community 2025 Little Kitten Ave. Manhattan, Kansas 66503 (785) 776-0065   
Special Pop., Elderly Via Christi Village 2800 Willow Grove Rd. Manhattan, Kansas 66502 (785) 539-7671   
State Gov., Animal 
Health 
Kansas Department of Agriculture 109 SW 9th Street, 4th Floor 
Topeka, Kansas 66612-
1283 
    
State Gov., Animal 
Health 
Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks and 
Tourism 
3705 Miller Parkway, Suite B  Manhattan, Kansas 66503     
State Gov., 
Epidemiology 
Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, Infectious Disease 
Epidemiology and Response Division 
1000 SW Jackson Street, Suite 075  Topeka, Kansas 66612     
State Gov., Homeland 
Security 
Kansas Department of Health and 
Environment, Homeland Security Division 
1000 SW Jackson Street, Suite 340  
Topeka, Kansas 66612-
1365 
785-291-3065 785-296-2625 
Wildcat, Public Health Fort Riley Department of Public Health 600 Caisson Hill Road  Fort Riley, Kansas 66442     
Wildcat, Public Health Geary County Health Department 1212 W. Ash Street, PO Box 282  
Junction City, Kansas 
66441-0282 
(785) 762-5788 (785) 762-1311 
Wildcat, Public Health Pottawatomie County Health Department 320 Main Street, PO Box 310 
Westmoreland, Kansas 
66549 
(785) 457-3719 (785) 457-2144 
Wildcat, Veterinary Fort Riley Veterinary Services 226 Custer Avenue Fort Riley, Kansas 66442     
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APPENDIX C - LOCAL INTERVIEWS 
Interviewee Michael McNulty, Homeland Security Operations Director of 
KDHE 
Date 06/13/2014 
My MPH Field Experience Report is over the resilience of the public health and medical system in the 
face of a burden to the system. Specifically, I am looking into Riley County and Kansas’ capabilities and 
capacities to handle a “medical surge” due to an influenza-like illness. A great example in the recent past 
is the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. 
I’m going to cover a short set of questions pertaining to response to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. 
The main purpose for this interview is to understand interventions that were performed during this time 
that served to reduce the burden to public health and medical services. Please feel free to share any 
particular thoughts from the events and any lessons learned or best practices following activities. 
Interview Questions 
State Department of Health – Homeland Security Operations 
Prior to Events 
Where were you working at the time of the 
outbreaks? 
 Op Sect Chief for KDHE during H1N1 
How prepared would you say your organization 
was prior to the outbreaks? 
 KDHE/KS have been involved in pandemic 
planning since 2006; some exercises prior to 
2009 
 Dr. [>] was new to position just a few months 
prior to events; needed to be brought up to 
speed 
 Plans as “worst case scenarios” (i.e.,, 1918) 
 Many plans have highest impact (not 
necessarily risk) incidents (i.e.,, anthrax over 
influenza) 
 KS CRA not quite ready but rushed to 
development 
Initial Activity 
How were you notified of the outbreaks? 
 Started in April; received SNS in May (until 
February 2010) 
What were the initial actions by you or your 
agency? 
 Good partnerships with pharmacies 
o Worked with insured AND uninsured by 
different methodologies 
o Allowed commercial pharmacies to pass 
along to uninsured 
o Commercial stock available 
 Activated branch within KDHE ICS for disease 
containment 
o Educational campaigns to employers and 
communities on disease containment 
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Interventions 
Typical interventions are vaccinations, 
pharmaceuticals, or non-pharmaceutical 
interventions such as quarantines. 
What interventions were provided (or observed) 
by you or your agency? 
 Medical countermeasures (SNS): antivirals 
(state cache); received ¼ of antivirals from 
CDC 
o Received almost out-of-date antivirals 
 Medical materials (SNS): respirators,  
 NPI: commercials and educational campaigns 
directed toward different audiences 
What interventions do you feel made the most 
significant impact in reducing the burden to public 
health and medical services? How so? 
 Public Information/education campaigns had 
the best effectiveness by providing public with 
tools to prevent disease 
 Working with commercial pharmacies to get 
antivirals to un-/under-insured populations 
What interventions did not pan out? 
 Could have been better with internal briefings 
(9 offices across the state; 6 satellites) 
Were there any interventions noticeably missing? 
 Isolation/quarantine not utilized (not deemed 
necessary) 
Conclusions 
Were there any significant lessons learned? 
 Plans written as “worst-case scenarios”; 
activities included were “drastic measures”; 
interventions needed to be scalable 
Could you briefly describe how preparedness efforts 
may have changed following the events? 
 Improved scalability of response operations 
Have any new plans/policies/procedures been put in 
place following the events? Any ongoing (i.e., living) 
documents? 
 Many revisions completed; completely 
overhauled KS Response Plan 
 Plans looked into for capabilities 
 KS CRA: continuous updates 
 KS Public Health Call: started with LHDs and 
transitioned to hospitals and others for SITREPS 
(daily at height); opportunity to encompass the 
vast reach of public health 
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Strengths Weaknesses Improvements Made Improvements Needed 
Final Comments 
  
   Minimum order of 
100 doses before an 
order could be made 
(took time to develop 
allocations for 
request) 
 MANY KDHE 
employees and 
offices; made 
communications 
difficult 
 AAR:  KS Public 
Health Call was 
viewed to be very 
beneficial 
 Better internal 
(KDHE) 
communications to 
allow employees 
from other branches 
to be better 
informed 
 Public Health 
Preparedness had 
many funds 
provided at the 
time; seeing PHEP 
and PH system 
funds being 
removed; can affect 
national responses 
and can reduce 
resiliency and 
capabilities of 
system 
 Funding by CDC was provided to assist three phases of H1N1 response in KS 
o Phase 1: Medical countermeasure and vaccine distribution 
o Phase 2: Included more activities for spending (disease containment) 
o Phase 3: Implementation of local vaccination campaigns 
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Riley County Health Department – Medical Director 
Interviewee Cary Herl M.D., Medical Director of RCHD Date 06/19/2014 
My MPH Field Experience Report is over the resilience of the public health and medical system in the 
face of a burden to the system. Specifically, I am looking into Riley County and Kansas’ capabilities and 
capacities to handle a “medical surge” due to an influenza-like illness. A great example in the recent past 
is the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. 
I’m going to cover a short set of questions pertaining to response to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. 
The main purpose for this interview is to understand interventions that were performed during this time 
that served to reduce the burden to public health and medical services. Please feel free to share any 
particular thoughts from the events and any lessons learned or best practices following activities. 
Interview Questions 
Interventions 
Typical interventions are vaccinations, 
pharmaceuticals, or non-pharmaceutical 
interventions such as quarantines. 
What interventions were provided (or observed) 
by you or your agency? 
 Vaccinations were performed, as available 
What interventions do you feel made the most 
significant impact in reducing the burden to public 
health and medical services? How so? 
  
What interventions did not pan out? 
 Unknown (vaccinations not uncommon) 
Were there any interventions noticeably missing? 
 Communications to providers was poor (both 
Conclusions 
Were there any significant lessons learned? 
 Outbreaks were not very bad, so not much 
chance to learn lessons 
Could you briefly describe how preparedness efforts 
may have changed following the events? 
  
Have any new plans/policies/procedures been put in 
place following the events? Any ongoing (i.e., living) 
documents? 
  
Prior to Events 
Where were you working at the time of the 
outbreaks? 
 RCHD (Medical Director), Candlewood 
Medical Group (primary care), Mercy 
Regional Health Center (inpatient care) 
How prepared would you say your organization 
was prior to the outbreaks? 
 Candlewood Medical Group:  no policy 
existed for dealing with a pandemic 
 RCHD:  somewhat prepared outbreaks 
 Hospital:  somewhat prepared for outbreaks 
Initial Activity 
How were you notified of the outbreaks? 
 There was a heightened awareness at the 
beginning 
 Notifications came by e-mail or fax for local 
responses 
 Most influenza patients had H1N1 
What were the initial actions by you or your 
agency? 
 Few response actions taken; cases treated as 
regular influenza 
 Vaccinations were started earlier than in prior 
seasons; vaccinations provided as soon as 
received 
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from KDHE and locally) 
Strengths Weaknesses Improvements Made Improvements Needed 
Final Comments 
  
        
 MERS may be a difficult pathogen; H5N1, too 
 Manhattan’s population is dispersed across the Wildcat Region due to Fort Riley and KSU 
 A biological event would be significant for terrorism due to fears 
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Riley County EMS – Emergency Services 
Interviewee Michelle Rutherford, Assistant Director of Riley County EMS Date 07/03/2014 
My MPH Field Experience Report is over the resilience of the public health and medical system in the 
face of a burden to the system. Specifically, I am looking into Riley County and Kansas’ capabilities and 
capacities to handle a “medical surge” due to an influenza-like illness. A great example in the recent past 
is the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. 
I’m going to cover a short set of questions pertaining to response to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic. 
The main purpose for this interview is to understand interventions that were performed during this time 
that served to reduce the burden to public health and medical services. Please feel free to share any 
particular thoughts from the events and any lessons learned or best practices following activities. 
Interview Questions 
Interventions 
Typical interventions are vaccinations, 
pharmaceuticals, or non-pharmaceutical 
interventions such as quarantines. 
What interventions were provided (or observed) 
by you or your agency? 
 More vigilant about identifying pts. with 
symptoms conclusive of flu.   
What interventions do you feel made the most 
significant impact in reducing the burden to public 
health and medical services? How so? 
 History taking and identifying suspected 
cases. 
What interventions did not pan out? 
 For us following procedure/protocol worked 
well; I don’t recall if we had any employees 
who were sick…maybe one. 
Were there any interventions noticeably missing? 
 None 
Conclusions 
Were there any significant lessons learned? 
 Stay vigilant due to any airborne virus. 
Could you briefly describe how preparedness efforts 
may have changed following the events? 
 Less intense, less “fear” as media had public in a 
heightened awareness “frenzy.” 
Have any new plans/policies/procedures been put in 
place following the events? Any ongoing (i.e., living) 
documents? 
 Not at this time…just standard reminders of 
doing good hand washing, pt history taking and 
equipment cleaning. 
Strengths Weaknesses Improvements Made Improvements Needed 
Prior to Events 
Where were you working at the time of the 
outbreaks? 
 Riley County EMS 
How prepared would you say your organization 
was prior to the outbreaks? 
 Ready but this tightened the process and 
changed others 
Initial Activity 
How were you notified of the outbreaks? 
 Mercy Regional Health Center/CDC 
What were the initial actions by you or your 
agency? 
 Training staff on EMS protocols for preventing 
disease spread from patients 
        
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APPENDIX D - SEARCH TERMS FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
Population 
General Terms Specific Terms 
1. Kansas "Riley County", Manhattan 
2. unvaccinated, "non-vaccinated" susceptible 
Exclusionary Terms 
(if needed/identified) 
  
    
Intervention (Pandemic Preparedness Activities) 
General Terms Specific Terms 
"public health preparedness" 
"pandemic preparedness", "influenza preparedness", "influenza plan", 
"Public Health Emergency Preparedness" (PHEP) 
"healthcare system preparedness" 
"Hospital Preparedness Program" (HPP), coalition*, "healthcare 
coalition*" (HCC) 
prophylaxis 
"mass dispensing", "mass prophylaxis", vaccination, "trivalent influenza 
vaccine", immuniz* 
antiviral* 
"neuraminidase inhibitor" (Relenza, zanamivir, Tamiflu, oseltamivir, 
Inavir, laninamivir, Peramivir), "M2 inhibitor" (Symmetrel, amantadine, 
Flumadine, rimantadine) 
"community partnerships", "community 
relationships", "community preparedness" 
"alternate care site", coalition*, "healthcare coalition" (HCC), "ESF-8", 
"ESF 8", "Medical Reserve Corps" (MRC) 
stockpil* 
"supply cache", "Strategic National Stockpile" (SNS), "personal 
protective equipment" (PPE), mask, masks, barrier*, N95 
"non-pharmaceutical intervention*" (NPI) 
quarantine*, "travel restrictions", "restricted travel", "restricting 
movement", "movement restriction", "social distancing", hygiene, 
"respiratory hygiene", "handwashing hygiene", "personal protective 
equipment" (PPE), mask, masks, barrier*, N95 
Exclusionary Terms 
(if needed/identified) 
antibiotic* 
    
Burden (Healthcare System Stress) 
General Terms Specific Terms 
influenza, flu 
"influenza-like illness" (ILI), H1N1, pH1N1, "swine flu", H1N2, H2N2, 
"Asian Flu", H3N2, "Hong Kong Flu", H5N1, "bird flu", "avian flu", 
"avian influenza", H7N7, "RNA virus", Orthomyxoviridae 
pandemic, "pandemic influenza" 
"1890 influenza pandemic", "Asiatic Flu", "Russian Flu", "Russian 
Influenza", "1918 pandemic", "1918 Spanish Flu", "1918 Spanish 
Influenza", "2009 H1N1 pandemic", "2009 influenza pandemic" 
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"novel strain", "emerging pathogen" 
"novel virus", "emerging virus", "novel strain", "PB2 protein", 
hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA), "highly pathogenic", viral 
"healthcare system stress" 
"medical surge", "bed availability", "available beds", "bed-tracking", 
HAvBED, hospitalization, "hospital admission", "exceeds capacit*" 
Exclusionary Terms 
(if needed/identified) 
bacterial, influenzae 
    
Outcome (Reduced Burden) 
General Terms Specific Terms 
prophylaxis vaccinat*, "prevent illness", "prevent disease" 
preparedness 
"increased surge capacity", "improved surge capacity", "increased 
capacity", "improved capacity", "increased capability", "improved 
capability", "memorandums of understanding" (MOU), "memorandums 
of agreement" (MOA), contract, training, exercis*, interoperable 
response "continuity of operations", "situational awareness" 
assessments, evaluations "vulnerability analysis", "hazard vulnerability analysis" (HVA) 
Exclusionary Terms 
(if needed/identified) 
  
  
Underlined terms are synonymous with one another. Orange terms reproduced between interventions. 
Care to be taken with truncation (*) when quotation marks in use. 
Modified from Sargeant et al. (2005, pp. 58-70).  
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APPENDIX E - SEARCH STRATEGY TEMPLATE FOR 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
Search # 
Database  
Host System  
Year Restrictions 01/01/2005 - Other Restrictions 
 
Search Strategy 
 
Search Date  Abstracts Returned 
 
Modified from Sargeant et al. (2005, p. 19).  
55 
APPENDIX F - ASSESSMENT AND EXTRACTION TOOL FOR 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
Article # 
Ref ID     Citation   
Source     Study Funding   
Study Design     Extraction Date   
Relevance     Quality   
Relevance Criteria 
Does the abstract describe a primary 
research study (as opposed to a review)? 
Yes 
No 
Yes: A primary research study was performed. 
No: A review was performed. 
Does the abstract describe community 
preparedness activities? 
Yes 
No 
Yes: The abstract described community preparedness 
interventions. 
No: The abstract does not describe relevant interventions. 
Does the abstract describe how 
community preparedness activities may 
reduce burden of medical surge from 
ILI? 
Yes 
No 
Yes: There is a connection made between the intervention 
and outcome of interest. 
No: No connections are made. 
Quality Assessment Algorithm 
Study Population 
Was the population within the study the 
population of interest or from a similar 
jurisdiction? 
Yes 
Similar 
No 
Yes: The population studied was from the jurisdiction of 
interest. 
Similar: The population studied had great similarities to 
the jurisdiction of interest. 
No: The population studied was dissimilar to the 
population of interest. 
Was the sample size determined by an 
adequate methodology? 
Yes 
Partial 
N/A 
Yes: Sample size was determined by by formula or other 
methodology. 
Partial: Sample size of study was was based on 
assumption. 
N/A: No details in text or no method to sample size 
selection. 
Intervention 
Were the intervention protocols 
adequately described? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Were appropriate controls used? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Outcome 
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Was an adequate connection made 
between the intervention and outcome? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Data Analysis 
Was the statistical analysis appropriate? 
Yes 
No 
N/A 
Yes: Methods were appropriate to study. 
No: Methods were insufficient. 
N/A: Statistical analysis not performed 
Were confounding factors appropriately 
considered? 
Yes 
Partial 
No 
Yes: Exclusions, matching, and/or analytical controls were 
used. 
Partial: Some controls used but not all identified as 
important. 
No: None identified. 
Conclusion 
Were the conclusions supported by the 
results? 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Data Extraction 
Study Population 
Location(s) of study:   
Population(s) used in study:   
Sampling used in study:   
Inclusion/exclusion criteria of study:   
Intervention 
Intervention(s) in use within study:   
Were the intervention(s) in use prior to 
the study? 
  
Control(s) in use within study:   
Outcome 
Specific outcome(s) of study:   
Secondary outcome(s) of study:   
Data Analysis 
Method(s) of statistical analysis:   
Confounding factors controlled for in 
study: 
  
Results 
Results obtained in study:   
Modified from Sargeant et al. (2005, pp. 78-97).  
